

All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown.

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UNITED STATES

Classify by: J23J98T32

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

Reason: (C)

Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated 10-█-2016

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Declassify On: █

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(S) IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number:

PERSON.

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(S) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to

conduct █, as described herein, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.), §§ █ (FISA or the Act).

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1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is

made by █, a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information officially furnished to █.

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2. (S) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The status of the target was determined in or about October 2016 from information provided by the U.S. Department of State.

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3. (S) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts

and circumstances in support of this application.

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a. (S) **The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power.**

(S) The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign power.

(U) (S) **The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).**

(U) (S) **The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia)** is an internationally recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof.

(S) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation

(S)




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(S)



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(U) (~~S~~) Carter W. Page




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 knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).


(~~S//XNR~~) This application targets Carter Page. The FBI believes Page has been the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government 



undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election in violation of U.S. criminal law. Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1). 

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




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I. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ **RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.**

~~(S//NF)~~ During a recent interview with an identified news organization, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "Russia has tried to influence U.S. elections since the 1960s during the Cold War" and "there's a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others." The DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation. The DNI added that "it shouldn't come as a big shock to people, ... I think it's more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can bring to bear in the same effort."



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[REDACTED]

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(S//XNF) In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (DNC).¹ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

There has been speculation in U.S. media that the Russian Government was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack. Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a net positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public." Despite Russia's denial, [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

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¹ (S//XNF) According to information on its website, WikiLeaks is a multi-national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says are from the accounts of DNC officials. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


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 In addition, according to an October 7, 2016 *Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security* (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statement states that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity that is not new to Moscow – the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statement states that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities.

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(~~S//XK~~) Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence U.S. elections, , and the information discussed herein regarding Russia's coordination with Carter Page

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[REDACTED] to undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] As stated in the legislative history of FISA:

Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

II. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ **The Russian Government's Attempts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.**

~~(S//NF)~~ In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos² and Carter Page (the target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy team. [REDACTED]


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[REDACTED] the FBI believes that the Russian

² (S) [REDACTED]


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Government's efforts are being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with Candidate #1's campaign.



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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~



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[REDACTED]

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As discussed below, Page has established relationships with Russian

Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

III. (U) (~~S~~) Carter Page.

(U) A. (~~S~~) Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS.

(~~S~~/~~XX~~) Page, a U.S. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] (~~S~~/~~XX~~) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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(S//NF)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] from approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] During this time, Page began

business dealings with Gazprom [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


(S//NF) According to information provided by Page during

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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(S//XNF) According to information provided by Page during [redacted] interview


⁴ (S//XNF) [redacted]


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⁵ (S//XNF) [redacted]

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with the FBI, 




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(U) (~~SECRET~~) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government). According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of


Russia.⁶ The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City residents as intelligence sources for Russia.

(S//~~XX~~)



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(U)⁶ (S//~~XX~~) Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov's arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia, without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison.



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(U) B. ~~(S//XNF)~~ Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

~~(S//XNF)~~ According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.⁷ In addition to giving this address, the FBI has learned that Page met with at least two Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI confidential human source (Source #1),⁸ [REDACTED] reported that Page had a

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⁷ (U) ~~(S//XNF)~~ [REDACTED]

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⁸ ~~(S//XNF)~~ Source #1 [REDACTED] and has been an FBI source since [REDACTED]. Source #1's reporting has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings and the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable. Source #1 has been compensated [REDACTED] by the FBI and the FBI is unaware of any derogatory information pertaining to Source #1.

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~~(S//XNF)~~ Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a

U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s), described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI.

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~~(S//NF)~~ Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible.

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(U) ~~(S//NF)~~

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secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.¹⁰ [REDACTED]

reported that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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(S//NF) [REDACTED] according to Source #1, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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⁹ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) ¹⁰ (S//NF) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2008 until August 2016, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin – a key component to his current standing."

¹¹ (S//NF) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Divyekin [who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin], [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had met secretly with Page

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and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or "kompromat"¹² that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it being released to Candidate #1's campaign.¹³ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) ¹² (S) Kompromat is a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.

¹³ (S//X//NF) [REDACTED]

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¹⁴ (S//X//NF) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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¹⁵ (XS//XNF)

[REDACTED]

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¹⁶ (XS//XNF)

[REDACTED]

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¹⁷ (XS//XNF)

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[REDACTED]

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(S//XNF)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that

Candidate #1's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #1's foreign policy leaders in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought "to make sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], adopted a "milder" tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1's shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter Page. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

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IV. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September 23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.¹⁸

(U) (~~S//NF~~) According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd News Article also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the article, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking

¹⁸ (~~S~~) As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI.

[REDACTED]

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The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly provided this information to the press.

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sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in other recent articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1's campaign repeatedly has made public statements in an attempt to create the appearance of distance between Page and Candidate #1's campaign. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #1's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign called Page an "informal foreign advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign." In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1's current campaign manager (the September 25th News Article). During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page is not part of

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Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page has been meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign" [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) (~~S//NF~~) On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations is nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet this year with any sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss any "final" questions the FBI may have.¹⁹

(~~S//NF~~) Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news

¹⁹ (~~S//NF~~) [REDACTED]

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organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations are complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he would be taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #1's campaign because the accusations are a "distraction." [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

V. (S//XNF) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

■ (S)

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 5, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

VI. (S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 4, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 4, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 4

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 4, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//XNF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) [REDACTED]

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

VII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (S//NF) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating and conspiring with the Russian Government, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Based on the

foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that Page [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

knowingly engage in

clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

(U) (S//NF) [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of the United States, [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) [REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]



(S) [Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. (S) Proposed Minimization Procedures As to all information acquired through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will follow [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



5. (S) Nature of the Information Sought Through the authorities requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. (S) Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

President as a certifying official in Executive Order Numbers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as amended, is set forth below.

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 7

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested

(S) The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the authorities requested in this application may produce information and material which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at

least a significant purpose of this request for [REDACTED]

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation of this target.

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED] (U) [REDACTED]

10. (S) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See also, [REDACTED])

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested. The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended. Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period of ninety (90) days.

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) (S) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities described immediately below for the period requested herein.

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy of the draft to the

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to the Court.


----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

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(U) VERIFICATION

(U) ~~(S)~~ I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information regarding **Carter W. Page** is true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, § 1746 on _____.


Supervisory Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6-1
b7A-1
b7C-1

~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) CERTIFICATION

(S) I, the undersigned, having been designated as one of the officials authorized to make the certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] requested in this verified application targeting

Carter W. Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power, as follows:

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1

(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is foreign intelligence information.

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal matters described in this application, the primary purpose of the authorities requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign intelligence crimes.

(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques.

b1-1
b3-1

(D) (S) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), i.e.,

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).



(E) (S) The basis for my certification that the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot be obtained by normal investigative techniques is as follows.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 8

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 8

(U) (S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) (S) Based upon the foregoing information, it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

(U) (S) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended.

James B. Comey
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

John F. Kerry
Secretary of State

Andrew G. McCabe
Deputy Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Antony J. Blinken
Deputy Secretary of State

John O. Brennan
Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency

Ash Carter
Secretary of Defense

James R. Clapper, Jr.
Director of National Intelligence

Susan E. Rice
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Stephanie O'Sullivan
Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence

Date

(U) APPROVAL

(U) (S) I find that this application regarding **Carter W. Page** satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approve its filing with this Court.

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 6

(S) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter

W. Page with the Court, [REDACTED]

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b7A-1
b7E-1

Loretta E. Lynch
Attorney General of the United States

Sally Quillian Yates
Deputy Attorney General of the United States

Assistant Attorney General for National Security

Date

(U) ~~(S)~~ WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application regarding **Carter W. Page** satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed orders and warrants which accompany this application.

Respectfully submitted,



U.S. Department of Justice

b6-3
b7A-1
b7C-3

All information is considered unclassified
except where otherwise shown.

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Classify By: J23J98T32

Reason: (C)

Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated 10-█-2016

Declassify On: █

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1

IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number:

PERSON

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ █ FISA or the Act), for an order and warrant (hereinafter "order") for █, and full consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds as follows:

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

█ 2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the Attorney General;

█ 3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is probable cause to believe that:

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Derived from: Application to the USFISC
in Docket Number captioned above
Declassify on: █

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b7A-1

SECRET

(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign power and Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

[REDACTED]

b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. The minimization procedures proposed in the application have been adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization procedures under [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5. The application contains all statements and certifications required by [REDACTED] and the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis of the statements made under [REDACTED] and any other information furnished under [REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:

SECRET

1. The United States is authorized to conduct [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of the target as follows; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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[Redacted text block]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[Redacted text block]



[Redacted text block]

b1-1
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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[Redacted text block]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

As to all information acquired through the authorities approved herein, the FBI shall follow [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

----- *The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank.* -----

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This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires at [REDACTED] Eastern Time
on the _____ day of January, 2017.

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b3-1
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Signed _____ Eastern Time
Date Time

To Be Determined
Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

SECRET